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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY KATZ, 
Plaint iff- Respondent, 
vs. 
RONALD JOHN ARNOLD and 
jANET LEE ARNOLD, his wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
15015 
This is an action commenced to terminate a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract whereby the Plaintiff was selling and the Defendants were 
purchasing, certain real property in Salt Lake County, Utah. The De-
fendants filed a Counterclaim wherein they claimed among other things, 
damages for forceable entry and detainer of the premises and for damage 
to personal property of the Defendants. 
-1-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT 
After hearing and trial, the District Court of Salt Lake 
County entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and dismissed the Colli:•· 
claim of the Defendants for failure of the Defendants to prove a · ...• 1 pnmata, 
case against the Plaintiff for damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to sustain the judgmental!' 
Lower Court and the dismissal of the Counterclaim of the Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff-Respondent agrees with the Statement oma• 
as set forth in the brief of the Appellants, except as to the particular 
ments and points as are hereinafter considered. 
The Appellants make reference to the Answer to lnterroga 
tories filed by the Plaintiff on February 14, 1974, as establishing the fact 
that one, Jerry Gardner, was acting for the Plaintiff. Therein said Inter 
rogatories, it was clearly set forth that the said Mr. Gardner was an 
independent contractor who had performed assorted and occasional repatr 
and remodeling jobs for the Plaintiff on different occasions during the 
previous six (6) months. (R. Page 30) Mr. Gardner was neithertheagell! 
nor employee of the Plaintiff. 
-2-
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The trial court sustained the Plaint iff's objection to the 
attempt of the Co- Defendant, Janet Lee Arnold, to testify as to an alleged 
conversation between herself and Jerry Gardner. (frans. P. 98, L. 23) 
The Court determined that the proposed testimony was hearsay and an 
attempt to prove the existance of an agency between Mr. Gardner and the 
Plaintiff based upon the statement of the proposed agent and further, that 
the same was not admissible under Rule 63 {9) or {10) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence as an exception to the Hearsay Rule. (frans. P. 98, L. 22 to 
P. 100 L. 25) The Defendants thereupon made a proffer to the Court as to 
the testimony proposed to be given by Mrs. Arnold. That proffer was as 
follows: 
We would proffer that Mr. Gardner stated to Mrs. 
Arnold at this time and also subsequently in the 
evening on this same day, Mr. Gardner stated to 
Mrs. Arnold that he had come to the premises to 
make repairs and to clean the premises on behalf 
of Mr. Katz, that he was told to do so on behalf of 
Mr. Katz, that in doing so he had removed property 
of the Arnolds from inside the home, placed it under 
the carport in order to get access ·to the premises, 
to {do) the repairs; also that he knew that --or he 
was aware that the Paynes had removed the property 
--other property of the Arnolds and that the Paynes 
had been instructed to do so by Mr. Katz. (frans. 
P. 99 L. 20) 
Upon the receipt of the proffer, the Court again refused 
the proposed testimony for the reasons as previously given. (frans. 
P. 100 L. 24) 
Upon Plaint iff's motion, the Counterclaim of the Defendants 
was dismissed. (R. 64-65, 72) 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
REFUSING TO ADMIT THE HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE OF THE CO-DEFENDANT 
JANET LEE ARNOLD, REGARDING HER 
CONVERSATION WITH JERRY GARDNER 
The Appellants argue that the proposed testimony reject;c 1 
I 
by the Court was necessary to establish that the said Jerry Gardner w" 1 
' ,_ 
the agent of the Plaintiff and absent its admission, that such an agency 
relationship could not be established. They submit that although such 
testimony was clearly hearsay, it nevertheless was properly admissible 
as an exception under either Rule 63 (9) or (10) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
Rule 63 (9) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as folic 
Vicarious Admissions. As against a party, a statement 
which would be admissible if made by the declarant at 
the hearing if (a) the Judge finds the declarant is unavail-
able as a witness and that the statement concerned a 
matter within the scope of an agency or employment of 
the declarant for the party and was made before the ter-
mination of such relationship, or (b) the party and the 
declarant were participating in a plan to commit a crime 
or a civil wrong and the statement was relevant to the 
plan or its subject matter and was made while the plan 
was in existence and before its complete execution or 
other termination, or (c) one of the issues between the 
party and the proponent of the evidence of the statement 
is a legal liability of the declarant, and the statement 
tends to establish that liability; (Emphasis added) 
The initial requirement for the acceptance of a hearsayst! 
ment under Rule 63 (9) (a) is a finding by the trial judge that the alleged 
--!-
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declarant was then unavailable as a witness. At no time during the trial, 
did the Defendants proffer to the Court any reason why Jerry Gardner was 
not called to testify at the hearing. The Defendants point out that the re-
turn of service executed by the Salt Lake County Sheriff on the Summons 
tendered for service upon Mr. Gardner in January of 1975, indicated Mr. 
Gardner could not then be located. (R. Page 50) Nevertheless, more than 
21 months elapsed between the date of that return of service and the trial of 
the case. The Defendants failed to offer any explanation as to their efforts 
during the intervening period of time to locate Mr. Gardner. At the time 
that counsel argued to the Court the question of the admissibility of the 
proposed testimony, Plaint iff's counsel directed the Court's attention to 
the fact that no evidence had been submitted or proffered as to the unavail-
ability of Mr. Gardner to testify. (Trans. P. 100 L. 19) Still, no attempt 
was made to justify the failure of the Defendants to call Mr. Gardner as a 
witness. 
A further requirement of Rule 63 (9) (a) is that the hearsay 
statement proposed to be introduced, must concern a matter within the 
scope of an agency or employment of the declarant. In otherwords, the 
subject of the proposed testimony must have been determined to be within 
the scope of an agency between Mr. Gardner and the Plaintiff. In the 
instant case, and as is represented by the Defendants in their brief, the 
purpose of the proposed testimony was to establish the agency itself. The 
testimony was not directed to any matter within the scope of an established 
-5-
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agency. Reference to the Defendants' proffer evidences that . I 
no evtdence I 
was to be introduced to show that the Plaintiff had in any manne .. I 
r authon1, 
or instructed Mr. Gardner to remove the property of the Defenda t ·1 
n s fror 
the premises. The proffer was only that Mr. Gardner had come to the ( 
premises to make repairs and clean the premises on behalf of the Plainttt 
and was told to do so by the Plaintiff. Completely lacking, was any pro-
posed testimony to the effect that the Plaintiff had authorized or instruwi 
Mr. Gardner to remove any property from the premises. In fact, the on] 
evidence placed before the Court relative to any instruction or authorizat
1
: 
given Mr. Gardner as to the removal of the property, was the testimony[' 
the Plaintiff and of Mrs. Judy Mayne. Mrs. Mayne was employed by the 
Plaintiff in the management of his office and property (Trans. P. 17 L. 2o]. 
Upon direct examination by the Defendants, she testified that she had 
specifically instructed Mr. Gardner to put all of the property of the !);lent 
in one room of the house and not to throw anything away. (Trans. P. m.l 
• I 
17-26; P. 44 L. 13) Furthermore, the Plaintiff had testified, as recalleot 
the trial court, that he had never authorized anyone to remove any proper 
of any kind from the premises. (Trans. P. 102 L. 25) All evidenceplac:l 
before the Court showed that Mr. Gardner was without any authority or 
f d f m the premioo' instruction to move any of the property of the De en ants ro 
1. h d the authoiii I Therefore, the proffered testimony would not have estab ts e 
f d. d in fact remi of Mr. Gardner to remove the property, but only that i he 1 
f the instru; 
the same, that he was then proceeding contrary to the terms 0 1 
-6-
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and authorization received by him from the Plaintiff. ln otherwords, the 
statement subject of the proffer clearly was not within the scope of an 
agency or employment with the Plaintiff. 
ln view of the fact that the proffer did not attempt to show 
the authority of Mr. Gardner to remove the Defendants' property from 
the premises, additional evidence or at least a proffer of the same, would 
have been necessary to have shown that the Plaintiff had authorized the re-
moval of said property. The failure to provide that evidence or a proffer 
of the same, made it mandatory for the Court to reject the proffer made. 
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial, Section 131. ln Patrick v. Patrick, 397 P. 2d 273, 
the Wyoming Court, citing Lewis Hubbard v. Mongomery Supply Co., 59 
W. Va 75, 52 S. E. 1017, ruled: 
"An offer to prove facts which must be followed by 
other proof to connect it is inadmissible unless 
there is also an offer to prove the connection. " 
397 p. 2d 273, 278 
The Defendants further submit that the proposed testimony 
was admissible under Rule 63 (9) (b) as constituting a hearsay statement 
relative to a plan by the Plaintiff and Mr. Gardner to commit a civil wrong. 
Additionally, they argue that the said Jerry Gardner would have been liable 
to the Defendants for any removal of the property of the Defendants and 
therefore, that the proffered testimony was admissible as a declaration 
against interest pursuant to Rule 63 (10) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 63 (10) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
-7-
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Declarations Against Interest ... (A) statement Which 
the judge fi.J_1ds was made by a declarant who is unavail-
able as a Wttness and which was at the time of the 
assertion so far contrary to the declarant s pecuniar 
... ~-terest or so far subjected him to civil or crim~al 
lta_btl_tty ... that the declarant under the circumstances 
extstmg would not have made the statement unless he 
believed it to be true; (Emphasis added) 
The Defendants argue that Mr. Gardner's activities Witr, 
they find objection, transpired in January of 1974. The Court determine: 
the right of possession of the Defendants' to the subject premises termt. 1 
November 21, 1973, and that the Defendants were unlawfully detaining::! 
premtses after that date. (R. Page 71) The Court did not find that ther 
was involved in or a party to the commission of a civil wrong. Nevenf: 
the subject proffer of evidence did not propose to show that the said Mr.· 
had been authorized or instructed by the Plaintiff to remove any of therr" 
of the Defendants from the premises. It was completely void of any fa::; [ 
which would have shown any conspiracy or plan to perpetrate a civil wrcu:\ 
Therefore, the Court could not have found that the alleged statement of\~ i 
Gardner would have subjected him to any civil or criminalliabilityaswc.l 
be required to permit the admission of the proposed testimony underRu\:\ 
(10). Additionally, Rule 63 (10), also required the trial judge to first fin( 
Mr. Gardner was unavailable as a witness. Once again, no attemptwa:r 
. . . f M G dner Further by the Defendants to establish the unavatlabtltty o r. ar · 
. geste~ "11 
nothing was placed of record or proffered whtch could have sug 
k the 
pursuaded the trial judge that Mr. Gardner understood that in ma mg 
-8-
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---
alleged statement, he could thereby have been subjected to civil or criminal 
liability. 
As argued by the Defendants, their subject proffer of testimony 
was not calculated to establish a matter within the scope of an alleged agency 
or employment between Mr. Gardner and the Plaintiff, but rather to establish 
that Mr. Gardner was in fact the agent of the Plaintiff. The Defendants 
attempted to establish the agency only by the extra judicial statement of the 
purported agent himself. This Court has ruled that the extra judicial declara-
tion of an alleged agent may not, in of itself, be used to prove the fact of agency. 
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 390-392; 120 P. 2d 285, 298-299; Beard v. White, 
Green and Addison Associates, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 423; 336 P. 2d 125, 126. 
Even in the event that the proffered testimony had been accepted 
by the Court, it would not have gone beyond that as previously offered and 
accepted. The prior testimony of the Plaintiff and of Mrs. Judy Mayne was to 
the effect that Mr. Gardner had been directed by them to go upon the premises 
to make repairs and to clean the same. There was still no evidence taken or 
offered which would have indicated that Mr. Gardner was anything other than 
an independent contractor and nothing further received or offered on the 
question of whether the Plaintiff had authorized Mr. Gardner to remove any 
of the property of the Defendants from the premises. With nothing further 
introduced, the Court would have been left with the obligation of finding that 
even if Mr. Gardner did in fact place certain of the Defendants' property 
outdoors on the carport, that in so doing, he operated contrary to the terms 
-9-
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of his authorization from the Plaintiff and outside the scope of h' 
ts author!: 
The Court did not have placed before it any evidence which would have 
established that Mr. Gardner was the agent of the Plaintiff and incidem;i 
that agency, authorized to remove the property of the Defendants ' , 
,rom tw 
premises. Therefore, the admission of the proffered testimony wouldc,:.
1 
have conformed to the testimony previously given and received. 
It is noted that the proffer proposed that the Cefendant, )~11 
I 
Lee Arnold, be permitted to testify that Mr. Gardner had told herthant I 
knew or was aware that a Mr. and Mrs. Payne had removed other proper 
of the Defendants from the premises and had been instructed to do so 
Plaintiff. Such testimony would have clearly constituted multiple hearsa1 
and would have been unacceptable as vague and uncertain. It wouldhavek 
impossible to lay a proper foundation for that testimony which would eswt
1 
how Mr. Gardner had acquired his alledged knowledge or become awareo: I 
activies of Mr. and Mrs. Payne and the alleged instructions received byt: I 
from the Plaintiff. Furthermore, even if taken at face value, the samdL 
of itself could not establish an agency as between the Plaintiff and Mr. anc 
'1 I Mrs. Payne, their having been introduced during the course of the tna on.·, 
d future Le" evidence to the effect that Mr. and Mrs. Payne were propose ·· 
of the subject premises. (Trans. P. 44 L. 14) 
CONCLUSION 
. h refusal of the The Respondent respectfully submtts that t e 
1 
-10- I ~ 
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trial court to accept the proffer of the Appellants did not constitute pre-
JUdicial error and should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gary A. Weston 
205 Metropolitan Law Building 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll 
Attorney for Respondent 
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